Бесплатный фрагмент - Essays on Hegel’s Philosophy of Science. Volume 1

Criticism of Hegel’s philosophy of science

Criticism of the philosophy of science does not entail criticism of Hegel’s philosophy of reason. However, Hegel really defies empirical views — just because it defines science as subjective forms of knowledge.

Modern empirical science is empiricism: knowledge of empirical phenomena is described in terms of relationships. Hegel calls this a deterministic episteme (negation) and rejects it as a rationalistic practice of abstract concepts. Criticism of Hegel is critical of those who accept this episteme, and considers its rationality inferior in comparison with the experience of the subject. Hegel’s concept of the rational is a concept of empirical determinism and, in turn, is subjected to critical analysis. This critical research is conducted empirically and by establishing an understanding of the subject.

This description of the critical practice of empirical science is known as the dialectical method. He tries to arrange the understanding of the subject in terms of his empirical experience, or his rational thinking. Hegel’s criticism is based on an empirical deterministic episteme, and that the rational itself is only an aspect of the subject. Consequently, Hegel’s thinking is fundamentally conditioned by his understanding of the empirical sciences.

However, there is a difference between epistemological criticism and the critical practice of empirical science. According to Hegel, in the critical practice of empirical science, a person looks at random aspects of nature, the world, and also at the empirical knowledge of the subject. Critical practice differs from its epistemological criticism in that in epistemological criticism it looks at the subject as if it were a certain knowledge. The subject has a certain knowledge, but at the same time there is no critical question about the nature of this knowledge and, therefore, there is no critical study of the subject.

Since the conscious subject represents himself only in the mental existence of his dependent objects, he is not aware of his subjectivity as an episteme. As Hegel says, «the essence of the philosophical consciousness or mental existence of the subject is self-reproduction.» Criticism of the subject’s dependence on his subjectivity is not a criticism of his reality as an empirical deterministic episteme.

Hegel would characterize this thinking as dialectical, because it is the formation of an understanding of an object in terms of a non-analytical way of thinking, which is a way of seeing. In this mode, subjectivity is incomprehensible from the point of view of its certain rationality, because this rationality is determined by the nature and external action of subjectivity. In the same way, it is incomprehensible from the point of view of its rational deterministic nature. This thinking is not thinking at all, because logic is inseparable from subjectivity in it, and subjectivity is not independent of objectivity.

Thus, the understanding of the non-analytical nature of the world and the critical practice of empirical science exists in a dialectical perspective. Since knowledge of nature itself is uncertain, we place our understanding of nature in terms of subjective certainty. We place our understanding of nature in the context of our subjective knowledge of our rational consciousness and its dependence. Since objective knowledge of nature is determined by its objectivity, we look at objectivity from the point of view of its subjectivity.

As for the method, we have to place it in a dialectical perspective, since it is not an external method. The method does not fit into the attitude of objectivity, since the method is not an external system that takes an external form. This is what arises from the movement and interaction of the subject with the object. The method of scientific research becomes the object of criticism not because it is within the assumptions of external objectivity; rather, it is because it itself has become a product of objectivity, namely objectivity as the one-sided and deterministic nature of subjectivity. Thus, the method becomes a non-analytical form of thinking in the context of non-analytical, independent subjectivity, because it depends on the subject, and not independently of him. This dependence on the object makes it possible for the method to think of the object as something in its own right.

Just as the problem of pure rationality does not exist outside nature, so does the problem of solving the problem of pure rationality. This problem exists in the context of a system of pure rationality, in which the decision is identified with the overcoming of subjectivity. However, the problem does not exist outside the solution, because the solution is always the product of the system that creates it. This system is subjectivity and, in a broader sense, knowledge of nature, which defines the rational nature of subjectivity, thereby defining subjectivity as dependent on objectivity.

Beginning in the 1960s, Hegel’s Anglo-American studies challenged the traditional interpretation of Hegel’s philosophy as a revolution in ethical thinking. One of the components of this problem, starting with the work of David Bell, was the theoretical substantiation of the contradiction between the literal, even Marxist, ways of understanding Hegel’s ideas and their philosophical validity as experiences. Even if Enlightenment thinkers understood the philosophical tradition as the ethical tradition of rational thought, as some understand in modern science, it was not the naturalistic methodology of modern philosophers.

Neo-Hegelians are interested in understanding the difference between the interpretation of philosophy in its traditional, metaphysical and metaphysical ways and its philosophical usefulness as an ethical discourse. For example, some authors believe that Hegel’s writings must be understood strictly in the traditional religious and philosophical terms revelation, revolution, rational mind, and so on. Although Hegel understands how the ancient Christians interpreted the Bible in terms of rational thought, there is something inherently irrational in the concept of religion and the accompanying theological rationalism that lends itself to the paradigm of ethical discourse. More precisely, Hegel’s ethical-philosophical method includes the concepts and practices of democratic egalitarianism, the democracy of rational thinking.

However, these conceptual values are not naturalistic values of rational thinking, democracy, egalitarianism. These values are not ideals of democratic (i.e. rational) equality of people. Rather, it is a kind of logical justice that accompanies the philosophical study of human nature. While these values of rational thought are ideals of democratic equality, the practice of democracy is not tied to the legitimacy of democratic practices and values. They are not an act of humanity’s ethical justice and rationality. It is a philosophizing method for creating practices of democratic thinking and equality.

For this reason, Hegel is often viewed in an extremely ethical-political context as the creator of a different ethics. Undoubtedly, the ethical-philosophical method of Hegel is a philosophically useful method of philosophical research. In the introduction to the English translation of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, Robert M. Young describes how Hegel’s ethical philosophy engenders rational ethics and democratic ideals of equality. Young, using a complex philosophical argument, argues that the texts of Hegel’s philosophy contain ethical concepts and values specific to democratic politics. These values are relevant to the study of political philosophy, even if there is no obligation to translate these values into terms of democratic practice and democracy itself. For example, the word «equality» is often found in an extremely ethical-political context in texts such as The Phenomenology of Spirit. However, this understanding of equality does not make it a democratic ideal in its naturalistic philosophical sense. Indeed, this understanding of equality is difficult to justify as an ideal for political discourse, since it presupposes that democratic processes can involve inequalities of power. Much more useful to interpret the ethical philosophy in its traditional metaphysical m method e.

Young insists that the relevant ethical concepts and values are those that characterize the ethos, ethical values and democratic ideals of the philosophy of rationality of ancient democracies. Such ethics and values are a form of philosophy and rational thought, but they are not democratic ideals and political practices in their naturalistic philosophical sense. Rather, these values are the idealistic principles of modern democratic politics. Such ethics and values are part of the culture of modern democracy, not an ethical or political form of rationalism. For example, Young insists that Hegel’s ethical-philosophical method is neither a naturalistic ethics nor a naturalistic philosophical methodology of rational thought. On the contrary, it is a moral method of rational thought, not ethics. Indeed, such an interpretation of Hegel’s method as an ethical methodology of rational thinking is unconvincing, since it can only mean that ethical-political practices can only take the form of rationalism, which is not a democratic ideal. This interpretation assumes that philosophy is simply an art or a methodology of philosophizing that has no democratic values. This is also not necessarily true for Hegel, because Hegel’s method can sometimes be a method of studying ethics without caring about democratic ideals.

This need to understand the philosopher’s ethical method in terms of democratic ideals is the reason why Hegel is often considered an ethical philosopher who is not a democratic philosopher. This interpretation denies that a philosopher can be an ethical philosopher with any political commitment. This interpretation assumes that only the naturalistic and philosophical method produces political ethics or democratic political culture, and that ethics without political commitment should not have any democratic ideals. In fact, for Hegel, the goal of his philosophy is to create the ideal of rational thought, which means that the political beliefs of a philosopher and his ideas about the ways of democracy are inevitably part of a philosophical enterprise. In other words, this kind of analysis is irrelevant to the study of political philosophy. A philosopher’s ethical commitment is not a condition of how he understands his philosophical methods or whether they should apply those methods. Rather, the common goal of modern political philosophy is to explore the cultural roots of the idea of democracy, and these cultural roots were deeply rooted in the ethical views of the ancient democratic philosophers of ancient societies. Consequently, Hegel’s ethical-philosophical method has democratic values and is associated with democratic ideals.

As a result, we must understand that ethical philosophy has democratic ideals that are not naturalistic. Rather, they are democratic ideals, philosophers and rationalists who were attracted by the philosophical discourse of ancient democracies. The ethical theory and method of the philosopher must be such that there are democratic ideals that the philosopher defends. Moreover, in order to defend these ideals, a philosopher must engage in ethical and political debates, and one way to engage in such debates is by adopting democratic political practice. Such interaction is impossible without adherence to democratic ideals. We can also see this in Hegel’s case, and this is the reason why Hegel’s philosophy has democratic ideals and politics.

In conclusion, Young suggests understanding the philosopher’s ethical theory and method in terms of democratic ideals and practices, and this might have been the right approach when there was a tradition of applying political ideas to ethical debate. However, Young rejects this approach now due to the relative historical lack of democracy in modern society. He writes: «As far as I know, there are no published works defending democratic ideals or democratic practices as a philosophical method. But those who believe that philosophy, especially ethical philosophy, is capable of justifying democratic ideas in the same way that political philosophies justify their ideas by being democratic, can use such philosophy to justify their political convictions. This is a mindset that could justify an abstract political ideology as the correct understanding of political issues in the democratic process». Young’s position that we must understand philosophical method and philosophy in terms of democratic ideals and practices does not seem very successful. One might be of the opinion that in the past, philosophers who led ethical and political discussions were involved in political discourse. But Young’s argument is that these discussions are no longer relevant to the study of modern society.

Because of this, his ideas and conclusions do not seem very productive to consider. Some merit can be seen in his claim that philosophy is not political philosophy, and because of the relative political absence of modern democracy, there is no need to view philosophers involved in ethical debates or their rationalistic theories in the political realm. But this seems to imply that philosophical methodologies containing ethical ideas and practices are not political methods. For example, thinking is a method that is used to solve ethical problems, while thinking involves an ethical view of the world or ethics. Of course, there are ethical concepts that are considered in the context of their theoretical obligations to analyze ethical issues, and philosophical texts also include ethical texts. It is not enough to think that the philosophical method is not political without wondering whether thinking about ethical ideas and practices is really the same as thinking about ethics. If so, then the former is not a political method.

The theory of spirit and nature

Hegel argues for an «layered» view of nature essentially, in which nature as a whole must be recognized as real, but metaphysically distinct from individual things, which are also real and metaphysically different from their properties: as we shift the emphasis from property to the thing is the «substance» of nature as a whole, we do not notice new «pieces», but rather recognize irreducibly different levels of organization.

There are at least three objections to this point of view. If each thing is so metaphysically different from its properties, how can a thing that is a plant, even if it has not been eaten, still be alive, reproduce and possess all possible characteristics «breathing». Is it really a «work of life»? Can we say that these «substances» exist due to their properties or due to the properties of the plants themselves? Even if the «phenomenon» is not a manifestation of a substance (and in modern physics all phenomena are manifestations of physical facts, although only those substances from which physical laws originate are substances), we know in advance what kind of qualities this substance has, and the highest grade should not be regarded as «magical.» There is nothing, in fact, that distinguishes the phenomena of «earth» from «air» in the sense of the standard. The data used to calculate the mass of rocks, minerals and plants are the same for all their forms and for all times. However, with regard to the plants themselves, we have not gone far beyond these data. That they are «a matter of life» is not a discovery based on qualitative observation, but a well-known fact of chemistry, geology and biology. As with minerals and plants, humans, who, we must conclude, have more personality, consciousness and self-awareness than other animals, are inherently different from animals, although in some cases they are different between these animal forms and their non-physical properties. On the one hand, our more developed state of knowledge makes this identical to our own development, while for animals, however, there is an acquired difference that has gone far beyond the limits of knowledge. The way of thinking underlying this metaphysics of nature presupposes a careful separation of concepts, one of which is «being,» and this allows a strict distinction to be made between of reality degrees and universality that may exist, that are possible. But this distinction in itself leads us to the impossible and thus also leads us to the conclusion that we humans are somehow separated from other forms of life, which we are told are just as real, although not inherently, or less important than they are. The only basis for this positive pluralism is given in the understanding of what is «absolute», in the metaphysical concept of the One. Hegel’s metaphysics of nature does not immediately explain itself, but insists on its explanatory effectiveness and uses these methods, which become more and more complex in the process, to achieve this very effectiveness. No systematic scientific thinking can explain this, and it only reveals itself when it happens to the human mind. As much as she tries to do it, this attempt is, in fact, an attempt to understand things as they are.

For if the inner essence of reality, things in the form in which they exist, radically differs from the statements of science and human thinking about reality, then they also become fundamentally «zero». Today, one of the most fundamental philosophical problems of our time lies precisely in this — or rather, it is better to describe it as a crisis of modern metaphysics, the crisis in which, despite the spread of concepts and theories, there is still no final, common basis of knowledge, which could explain the most fundamental metaphysical concepts. We believe that no other philosophical system has resolved this crisis, although many have proposed formulations that attempt to resolve it. We affirm that Hegel’s philosophy of nature, if based on reality as it is in itself, and recognizes this reality as something beyond thought and capable of being simply described, is the only philosophy that can solve the problems, delusions of modern metaphysics, and thus provide the basis for further progress and further development of science and, therefore, human thoughts.

Objective characteristics of feelings and concepts of understanding and objective consciousness are provided by «Science». At the level of perception, visibility and awareness of specific things, a person’s awareness of what is objectively in front of him, and what things are doing objectively, is provided by science and is of interest, significance and value for everyone who is concerned and concerned about these things. If the laws of the system are necessary by themselves, we need to find them. The problem is posed: «How do we explain them? How do they relate to ’me’? «Hegel does not offer an answer to this question. What is presented as a problem is itself a problem for metaphysics. Kant’s idealism is an attempt to solve this problem, and the solution given to us, although Kant understood the problem very clearly, does not solve the problem. Science takes «nature» as a given, «nature» itself is objectively observed, «nature» is what we see or observe. Hegel is challenging. No one yet knows how to explain phenomena from nature, from the facts of phenomena, but instead from nature, reality.

Therefore, to ask the question: «How do we explain those sensory and conceptual phenomena that occur in nature? How do we explain those phenomena that do not correspond to the laws of the system? «Hegel raises the question of the direct experience of the phenomena of the physical world, the meaning and existence of concepts. If the «world of the spirit» is not something «simply» external to the «mind», and the subject about which these concepts are considered is not a purely external «nothing», but «identity» or «self-manifestation», «then it is impossible find out the actual or the object of these concepts.

Unlike the Kant’s «inner feeling» or «inner experience», which are internally accessible to reason, the «world of spirit» or spirit does not «exist» or can be cognized only «internally» in the sense that the laws of logic, at least since they are studied in school, make "observation" possible, and physical laws, at least in the form in which they are known to us, give an idea of what the" world of the spirit" and reality are.

(I) For the Hegel’s theory of spirit, it is beyond any dispute, to think and imagine, and for the formation of representations or concepts, for the «soul» of a person is nothing but to develop dialectics through the combination of thought and reality. The very existence of dialectics is a feature of life, because as soon as the nature of life is assessed, it becomes clear that in the process of life there must also exist a world of «matter» (sensuality that takes an objective form), that is, reality, and this is what is needed for understanding things and human life. One part of the world discovered in the course of these phenomena of physical nature is the interaction of form (relativity, inertia, viscosity, buoyancy) with matter (geometry, mass, weight). But this part of the world, that is, the world of «matter» and individual objects, in this case «nature», has its own nature, its own world, since it is not the world of reason, but not the «world of spirit».

Metaphysics has discovered that this world or natural phenomenon has limits and special limits, which are determined by the nature’s law, like the world of feelings and concepts, and which are determined by reason. Limits and, in particular, the restrictions should know about «peace of mind» — a limitation of himself, as well as the limits of logic, or general abstract ideas.

Natural world — it’s the only world that shape the world of the spirit is able to recognize, and thus, the overall essence of natural phenomena is clearly revealed, that is the «spirit world» is itself the only substance. But the only manifestation of spirit and matter in nature is their particular incarnations.

The discovery of these particular incarnations of spirit and nature at first was a mystery. What is the nature? What is spirit and what you can imagine (the concept) and understand (the mind)? The discovery of a stable organic concept (gnosis, primary existing in life experience) reveals this mystery. This gnosis is the true knowledge of the «world of the spirit», which allows a person to be a rational agent, a capable actor, a moral agent. Thus, it was the discovery of this gnosis, that is, the disclosure of the hidden, but undeniable and universal nature of reality, which really became the true meaning of philosophy.

But the gnosis of nature and the spirit world is not really considered true by the mind. For what is real or «visible» senses may seem «impossible» to the mind to be understood and expressed in a known way through the work of the mind, which is the action of the «primary form» of thought. The feeling of a necessary connection between the mind and the world did not seem to mind his function, but rather, it seems to phase and the overall operation of the mind, «the primary form» the one he got confused with. The essence of reason is not to reach the world through a pure rational form of thought, but to find its connection with the world through reasoning or this gnosis of spirit and matter, with which it has already come into contact in principle and thus belongs to besides the «world of the spirit» with which the former has a common origin.

If serious about philosophy, you will need to take it either as a kind of abstract in favor of academic dogma, or as something that brings to mind a person something comparable to philosophical phenomenon: gnosis of nature. The assumption of such an analogy is erroneous. For the gnosis of nature consists in the disclosure of an adequate order of things, which is not imposed on man by his will. The task of philosophy is to find out the appropriate order and transmit it to the human in a rational system in accordance with strict rules established by the science of nature.

However, science does not show us the order of things in itself, but the image itself, the correct harmony of these things. When a person becomes a rational subject, he begins to «judge» the natural order. For this he must know the explanation of things. We can say that the natural sciences must show him how to be a rational agent. If they have not fully explained the matter, the person cannot express it in their own way; it must be directed towards a solution from a source other than nature. Therefore, a person is forced to philosophize. In this way, a person learns how the natural order works.

Phenomenology of spirit

Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, as its name indicates, is a phenomenological study of our experience. The Topics section of the book lists twenty questions that seem most important to us to consider. The questions are divided into two broad sections: logical-scientific questions, useful as a starting point for reflection, and new questions of spiritual meaning and ideal logic.

These questions fall into three categories: is subjective consciousness the basis of existence; is whether the «I» a prerequisite for the physical reality; and is ethical life more than simple behavior or outward conformity to society? The sections in the first three questions roughly correspond to the causal and functional categories of rational and physical reality. The substance that establishes the possibility of the first category is the original intentionality of intuition, which is self-determining and the basis of conscious existence.

The first category answers this question by presenting the model of the human soul from the point of view of its essence or the immateriality of its consciousness. However, since reality is constituted through our bodily form, this model leaves very few free areas for interpretation.

The second category of questions answers this question by presenting a model of the material world as a process of self-production and improvement, as well as the role of consciousness in maintaining this process. However, this model leaves a lot of room for interpretation: how can we confirm the qualitative difference between inorganic and organic substances, rejecting their direct relationship with each other as two types of matter?

In the third category of questions, the model goes further and subjects the object of consciousness to strict logic as a complete definition of what it contains. In doing so, it constitutes a practical level of inquiry, showing that our awareness of existence is both definite and negative.

The Logical Considerations section, which consists of four chapters, provides a unified model of how things are, and offers a basic exposition of such a view of things in natural sciences or according to this standard in general. He is interested in the internal structure of objects as a whole and the unity of their appearance. This internal structure, which is most fully presented in the first three sections, connects objects with the world from the inside, exploring their relationship within the framework of phenomenological consciousness. For Hegel, consciousness is the universal substance of the human mind, its only possibility of conscious existence. It is a state of awareness that is itself a natural element of life and the form of thought. This theory of consciousness views the human mind as the highest reflection of the world, its criterion of reality, its unique and most powerful act of interpretation. Since consciousness is the source of conscious existence, it must have its own way of development, but the development to which it undergoes is self-determined and ultimately self-destructive. In other words, conscious perception is, in principle, purely and simply a process of self-denying, self-destructive and contradictory the discursive activity that destroys itself in a series of self-destruct levels and self-critical of a procedure called the process. These processes can be viewed as conclusions of different minds, the solutions of which are not the final solution to the problems they face.

Section of the book «Conversations» or the «practice of cognition», offering to answer the questions raised in the first three questions, answering them through a three-part description of the world of sensuality, the analysis of the object of perception and cards the contents of mind through deep and intensive analysis of perception. The second third presents Descarte’s conceptualization of nature and the unambiguousness of experience, as opposed to determinism and the autonomy of sensibility. The emergence of consciousness as the highest material reality is articulated and studied by referring to how the self-negative activity of consciousness ultimately eliminates itself through analysis of its conceptual structure.

The idea of «death» as the spiritual culmination of every philosophical consciousness gives Hegel an explanation of the living nature and, ultimately, the very nature of life. The Logic section of the book offers a clear delineation of the logical positions that Hegel takes in The Phenomenology of Spirit, as well as some indications of which of the most controversial areas of dialectical issues lie in his theory.

Since Hegel makes the central role of consciousness his central task in The Phenomenology of Spirit, he takes a critical approach to philosophical self-understanding in general, both in relation to its constitutive role in consciousness and in connection with its relationship with the other two levels of thought, i.e. … material and ideal. He develops his criticism of the entire theory of philosophy in the section «Logic». It presents an «existential critique» of thought, in which the integration of the abstract and the concrete is an essential and necessary characteristic. What is «thinkable» and what can be interpreted as what exists in the world lies at the very core of thought, and only if thought can adapt itself to such a concept of its object can its own existence be discovered.

Philosophy as a kind of mathematical and then dialectical study of logical thinking stems from the systematic nature of this division into abstract and concrete. This division creates the concept of self-contradictory judgment as such, which is revealed as the postulation of denying oneself as being and, therefore, one’s own denial. This concept, the negation of itself, is itself a position of absolute being and, therefore, its own negation. Thus, nothing in existence, «nothing in thoughts» can be defined; as a simple negative concept, it can always include only the postulation of its own denial, in other words, the denial of itself. Then, in the «Logic» sections, you can see how this relativizing concept, turning into itself, defines what is outside of it, and thus is itself contradictory. When this contradictory definition is thus expressed in its own terms, it allows for the further development of the same intellectual procedure and a further and more extended alienation of thought, and finally, a single essence that replaces the absolute nature of essence.

Then «Logic» reveals the relationship between the idealistic theory of knowledge and the dialectical view of knowledge. In Kant’s philosophy, the thought of formal thinking is associated with the concept of the absolute, and Hegel’s concept of absolute thinking is also associated with the concept of consciousness and with the concept of absolute consciousness. Then Hegel opposes the abstract and the concrete, on the one hand, and a self-contradictory idea, on the other, arguing that there is always an interval between these two diametrically opposite concepts, which is the impossibility of separating these abstractions from consciousness and therefore it is impossible to look at things from a subjective point of view. That is, from the point of view of the side of consciousness from which the theory of knowledge was developed. Thus, he expands Kant’s idealistic model of thinking. In the paradoxical assertion that all objects are the same in themselves, or that at least one object contains all others, Hegel introduces a new dimension to his model of thinking in dialectics, explaining that this is the same subjective point of view. In other words, in his reading of Kant, Hegel transfers the conversation from the absolute to the empirical, from the point of view of materiality and pure form, to the point of view of perception and self-awareness. But he does so within the positivist framework that he found in idealistic philosophy. The theoretical form is either objective or subjective, but it cannot simultaneously adhere to these two points of view. And since he cannot keep both, he separates them.

In relation to the real to the ideal, Hegel proclaims that the real is here as the absolute being of the ideal, but only under the conditions in which these two oppositions have the power to be as such in reality. But in reality, this does not happen, since self-consciousness, the subjective point of view disappears. Since he abandoned his idealistic concept of real knowledge as objectivity and consciousness in the pure form of understanding, Hegel is forced here to defend his theory of knowledge from the attacks of idealism. As he just demonstrated in The Phenomenology of Mind, there can be no clear distinction between existence and the act of knowing, since such a distinction implies a break with the concrete as such, and therefore with the absolute as such. This existence is the totality of existing forms of the absolute; it is an act of cognition as the identification of form with matter. But, as we saw earlier, this is not the case. For Hegel, self-consciousness, which Hegel identifies with the condition of its existence, is not thinking in itself as such, but rather the postulate of his self-consciousness as his very concrete self-identity.

Thus, Hegel’s dominant idealism is not consciousness as such, but self-consciousness as such, under the guise of pure self-consciousness. It is self-awareness that acts as an opposing factor in this opposition, connects the real with the ideal. Indeed, self-consciousness becomes a simple understanding in itself, and this understanding, like any understanding, itself opposes itself, that is, its idea of itself. If we continue to be self-consciousness, and not simply in relation to the other, then this other will be simply the same purely abstract self-consciousness that postulates itself, and which is also this abstract self-consciousness, which then abstracts the other for itself in that act of self-concealment, which binds him to himself. Thus, the relationship between self-consciousness and its object, between consciousness and its object, become identical with the objects themselves. Self-awareness only identifies with this abstract object of self-concealment, but it makes its own object as simple as possible.

As soon as self-consciousness joins the object as a pure abstract self-consciousness, it abstracts it from itself, which means for Hegel that it makes its entire content independent of its content, since the content of consciousness is essentially identical with the content that is now in it is revealed. Indeed, content only again becomes content in their unity with representation, and representation and content are themselves presented in a manner opposite to that in which they were presented to consciousness. If the content in consciousness in itself is self-consciousness, then in self-consciousness itself, the content of consciousness is self-consciousness as such.

Hegel argues that the mind of an individual has its own content only if it comes into conflict with its own content. But if this assumption were correct, then the need for a concept would be an essential prerequisite. In other words, if content were just an element of content (a simple aspect of content), then a concept that is purely a concept of content would be absolutely necessary and impossible.

Here the object is not just the noumenal content of consciousness, but the truly noumenal content of consciousness as something that opposes and opposes the content. All that the content consists of is a contradiction that it opposes to itself. This contradiction, however, is not just a relation between content and a single object or between different contents in space, as a noumenal relation; for even a simple contradiction of content or the relation of two contents as an individual is still a relation of existence and, nevertheless, contains both of its contradictions. Rather, contradiction is the relation of content to an object and in relation to its own nature. In other words, contradiction is the relation of the content of consciousness to itself. It is not just the relation of content to content, the relation of the content of consciousness to itself, the relation of the content of consciousness in the form in which it is contained in consciousness, that is, as absolutely objective, as non-transcendental content, content that has nothing to do with this consciousness. This is an absolute contradiction in itself; and insofar as it contains the contradiction of the content as the content itself, the content itself is an objective contradiction.

In fact, this means that for Hegel, content is the relation of reason to itself, that is, its self-consciousness. Content is his own object, which becomes himself as opposed to himself and thus fundamental to his self-consciousness.

Since content is subjective, it is an object that is the opposite of itself. Objectivity (opinion) is primarily subjective. On the other hand, for Hegel, the goal is the opposite of its subject. Thus, the relationship between the subject and the object, the essence of which is the content, has the opposite, namely the other side, which is opposite to itself, that is, the content of which is its object. This opposite relationship can only be thought of as a relationship between content as an object and oneself as content. It is not only the relation in which the content is constituted, but also the most basic relation between the content as an objective being and this object as the subject of this being. Only at this point, a distinction between objective and subjective, because it is here that the concept can be understood as opposed to its object, as the idea of its object in the form of the content, as the content of the object, which contains a conceptual object.

In his discussion of the categories of the finite, Hegel connects this with the study of the meaning of the concept of essence and, thus, with what we might call the Hegelian concept of categories. The statement about the essence of a thing will connect it with such and such an essence; that is why Hegel calls it the way of being. But this is a metaphysical statement that includes the category of limitation and thus leads to the necessity of the Absolute. This is what he means by the non-existence of the absolute; his answer is to conclude that «we are not and cannot be in the Absolute… as the principle of their very presence in it…» According to Hegel, the Absolute can never be named, because its very existence threatens himself. Thus, there is no unity with what is said in the Absolute as such. Indeed, Hegel’s pre-analogous hypothesis that no substance exists apart from itself is radically nothing more than the inconsistency of being and nothing. Moreover, we are being asked to discover a term for what we are — a concept. He argues that it is limited, namely, it is not a transcendental concept: «the concept of man is not a concept of God.» We need a category of intersubstantial concepts to develop such a category of concepts. And this, in turn, I call the Hegelian concept of their subjective representations. These concepts should be included in the concept of Being, but they are distinct from Being and for which there is a continuum of being in addition to one Being. This means that positive and negative concepts of the world, together with their aspects, are not the same thing; for the «subjective concepts» of subjectivity, for example, are not simply a relation of affirmation (to oneself) and denial (of oneself), but rather, and more radically, a relation of negation. There are other points to consider. The idea of one being in relation to another is a formalization; in fact, we will have to say that this particular negative must be in addition to another negative (in fact, not to itself), otherwise the former will not be one with the latter.

Hegel’s science of logic ends with the idea that the absolute is the subject, it is pure thought that penetrates into all its internal contradictions. For him, «the absolute is that whose substance is in itself, not just purified, but, as it were, just in itself.» But the absolute should be understood not as an appearance, but as a necessary movement, as an impulse to the final end. At a more primitive level, the absolute is understood as the world as a whole, as well as all its integral parts. Or, Hegel argues, what is then called the absolute is everything that ultimately expresses his character. Therefore, everything that is self-proclaimed by its integrity is absolute; and therefore the horizon of all true understanding of the world is the «absolute» of the world itself. All «concepts of the absolute» are, in fact, contradictory subjective concepts, and all of them — including Hegel himself — have their sources in the empirical world. In the Absolute, the objective world is false; but by expressing the absolute through it, the subject comes to it and through this awareness realizes its own true identity.

Hegel’s «theoretical» approach culminates in the denial of the autonomy of one absolute; and in order to find an answer to the problems of this concept, he introduces a double antithesis. He gives it the opposite of the characteristic of being, and the characteristic of being «just like that.» By expressing that he «discovered» this opposition, Hegel tries to correct his theory of the concept; but the kind of correction presupposes that in the nature of the concept there is an «exact» opposite, but only that which is not under the control of the empirical concept. Hegel has a decisive concept, an absolute idea, which he understands as independent of the empirical idea, while the empirical concept controls two opposite absolutes.

This is misleading, and Hegel’s approach is taken by many modern philosophers for whom nature has a master and a slave. The master of nature is the idea that the two opposite poles of nature are separate and independent. The slave is the only empirical idea of nature that obeys it, but does not control it.

On the contrary, the slave has the right to control the master; and to discover the nature of each concrete nature, there must be a master’s knowledge, which can only be read as an abstract concept. Through this discovery, the slave sees what nature contains in its own nature, and thus no longer considers himself a slave by nature, because «in the object there is only that which is the conditions [the slave’s own conception of nature] and which he can first open in yourself. Then the master must be perceived by the slave as a simple object; the slave realizes that he is a slave and not a master.

If we return to Hegel’s critical attitude, we must ask the question: what can we learn from him? His answer is: «the concept, which is the existence of the deterministic, and, therefore, [that] through it [concrete] forms themselves are seen as absolute beings; thus [concept] implies knowledge of the deterministic itself. «The only thing that he really explains is not that the absolute is itself an absolute concept, but that the absolute is the concept of its own object — the entire cosmos in which it is through itself. Thus, Hegel proposes what John Dewey calls the «most enlightened» theory of history, in which the deterministic idea is seen not as an expression of the absolute in the real world, but as a project of one part of reality. It is very important to see that this is not a theory of progress or creation, but a non-absolute field of ideas in their relation to the ideal.

We have seen that when Hegel opposed the empirical idea to the absolute idea, the thesis that the empirical idea is the idea of the empirical world, from the point of view of the purely empirical world, looks like a contradiction; because Hegel is never forced to accept the analysis of an idea in its empirical form. For Kant, the opposite thesis, the thesis that the empirical world is the idea of a perfect world, appears as a direct contradiction, because the perfect world is a purely ideal concept of the area in which all empirical reality is located. Here Hegel is forced to accept a scheme that neither Hegel nor Kant could arrive at independently; and in the transcendental ego, Hegel produces a not quite conscious transfer of the immanent concept to the purely ideal sphere of the concept. Hegel places the immanent form of the entire system in the Absolute Idea; the idea finds expression in this sphere, which, in turn, reveals its immanent form. Thus, the immanent form of the whole world is created only as a perspective of the Absolute Idea.

Hegel’s systems

In studying Hegel’s philosophy, we ask ourselves what kind of philosophical work he actually did. This question is closely related to the question of the Hegelian system itself. What exactly was the system itself? Of course, this is incomprehensible, because only theoretical works are known, and none of the practical works has been discovered. In fact, we have several conflicting systems: the systematic thinking of two separate thinkers. It is unclear to what extent in each work Hegel’s thought was an attempt to integrate the threads of his conflicting systems. In Logic, which should be understood as a whole, the idea of the Absolute Idea is presented as a complete series of ideas and their relationships; but even in this respect it is difficult to determine which of the new ideas from Hegel’s system found their expression in logic. If we judge Logic simply by itself, it may seem that it represents the all-encompassing content of Logic; but, if we divide Logic into three parts and look at Logic separately, we must find that even in Hegel’s mind the thought of the Absolute Idea presents a special problem. Thus, in his first two works (the first «Phenomenology» and the second «Logic») Hegel makes implicit references to the Absolute Idea; but in the third work, Principles, where the only clear hint refers to the idea of essence, the word «Essence» has no meaning. The second step is to integrate Hegel’s entire system so that all his thoughts have clear meaning. This is not the case here. The sections of Logic that deal with the Absolute Idea are mainly divided into two classes: the connection of the Absolute Idea with «secret» and «pure wisdom» and, finally, the connection of the Absolute Idea with God. In his work Logic, Hegel then takes the «secret of the inner self» and transforms it into the logic of the Absolute Idea. The whole subject matter of this second step is beyond the scope of the first step, the subject matter of the Absolute Idea.

Two other functions should be highlighted. The first, corresponding to the first step, is to explain certain forms of thinking that appear on the surface contradictory; for example, thinking about necessary being and thinking about your opposite, existence. The second step in Hegel’s thought is the completion of his system, its culmination. In the Phenomenology, Hegel’s idea of the Absolute Idea is transferred from the purely logical sphere to the transcendental one; but the integral system of logic cannot be understood apart from the entire development of Hegel. This dialectic in general and the construction of an integral system seems to be the most difficult of all.

The problem of cognizing truth in all its forms is the central problem of philosophy. All religions and metaphysical systems claim truth as the truth of experience, the revelation of God, or some other truth that transcends language. If these statements are true, then faith itself is also true and beyond the reach of rational criticism.

It is the great duty of Christianity to point the way to truth. It is possible that the average believer will find his true religion through study, viewing of the scriptures, the New Testament books, or some of the other intellectual landmarks on which Christianity stands. But in the presence of religion as such, all forms of theology that do not meet this great task are in danger of collapse. The result is the assertion that in order to know God, or something like God, it is necessary to consider the infinite.

Non-reductionist logic, being not only a method of explanation, but also an ideal a priori reflection of the present, can help to establish the external validity of theoretical statements and formed the basis of many important philosophical applications of logic. It provides a framework for both formulating logical laws and accepting philosophical arguments. At the same time, however, its subject is both highly philosophical and political in nature and concerns the question of which sets of true evidence constitute our best means of knowledge, and which do not correspond to them. His emphasis on the value of empirical inquiry and the recognition of uncertainties leads him to address directly ethical issues as well as other forms of epistemological inquiry. And yet his concern for the «ought» as opposed to the «is» is for Hegel the cornerstone of his philosophy of science. The ontological foundation of logic, with its rigidly defined and analytically verifiable contradiction and subjectivity, is also the cornerstone of its metaphysics of spirit and its ethics. However, in order to understand both the content of this part of philosophy and its rich potential, it is necessary to clarify Hegel’s exact philosophical intuition and his very technical presentation of his method.

Natural science explores the causal relationship of the observed natural phenomena. In a short paragraph, he defines the limits of this study and its relationship to morality and social order: «If we assume that a certain phenomenon is a prerequisite for all other phenomena, and that it necessarily determines all the results of observation and contributes to their reality, then this a phenomenon cannot be excluded from the theory of the phenomena it affects. "The difference between natural science and ethics is that the former develops in terms of discoveries, while the latter does not. As you can see, philosophy begins with this first path, but ends with a closed system or the reduction of this course of history to a reduction of one aspect of the subject. Only by understanding correctly can society recognize the limits of its own understanding and accept the proper means of ensuring the peace of mind that is at the heart of ethics.

Hegel’s comparison of science and ethics was actually motivated by the need to reveal the conservative nature of a certain, rather secularized philosophy, which gave way to both socialist reaction and a fundamental change in the foundations of political thought. In his Portrait of a Young Hegel, Emile Bertrand du Chatel, referring to his friend’s early attempts to form a political project, argues that «the solution to the problem of the state and the formation of a social order can only be achieved through the revelation of the prerequisites of the relationship of freedom of the individual and the state.» In his «course and problems of socialism» Hegel describes how progress in ethical research towards ethical policies will be based on «classically d ’idealism of Fichte. Thus, the structure of Hegel’s problematization is predominantly political in nature. Where will the «classical» concept of the state begin and how will it develop? How will the natural sciences, whose main problem is the characterization of the real, relate to this «classical» idealism?

As soon as we realize that the question of state is to what extent consciousness and the self can be aware of their relationship to the world, we are faced with the same problems, the solution of which is also associated with the search for new premises for the problems of human existence. The development of Kant’s struggle with his antinaturalism, the Hegelian confrontation of the social world, and the recent attempt to revive the idea of God as the basis for all reality prompted critics to question the final status of the «politics of society.» This and related questions require a proper analysis of the ethical content of philosophy, as well as the revaluation of its development, compared with its original character shapes as the second historical research.

The classic opposition to authority comes from Plato. According to his Republic, when Plato introduces a state of nature with its own laws, divine man will lead free citizens to worship the greatest features of earthly society. Then the state becomes just such a society with its own laws. This opposition is certainly not new. Philosophy has already said that a society cannot do without the law, as he wrote the Jewish philosopher of the first century, Philo in «Scoop life» to describe the physical world as «a huge and chaotic accumulation of mixed animal… here it is… the wisdom behind all this barbarism», and therefore political life must arise through «wisdom», which is really a law, a law.